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Horseless Horses 
Car Dealing and the Survival of Retail Bargaining 
Steven M. Gelber 
News reports suggest that in the near future, electronic chips on every 
item in a store will allow consumers to be charged for purchases automat-
ically by simply walking out through the door. 1 No checkout clerks will 
ask the shoppers if they found everything they were looking for; no check-
out robots will ask if the customers would prefer to hear their oddly infl-
ected voices speak in Engl ish or Spanish; nothing tangible will mark the 
exchange of value. This invisible transaction will be the latest evolutionary 
step away from the complex face- to-face negotiation between buyer and 
seller that once marked almost every retail transaction, one that uniquely 
survives in the purchase of an automobile. 
Would-be buyers who walk into automobile dealerships in the 21st cen-
tury enter a time warp. They are transported back to the early 19th cen-
tury, to an era before goods were sold to all shoppers at the same posted 
price and before dissatisfied customers could return their purchases. They 
are confronted by sales personnel who are masters of the ancient arts of 
flattery, high pressure, misdirection, misrepresentation, and patience. 
They are willing to sit for hours haggling over the cost of everything from 
the basic car itself, to the moonroof, the floor mats, the interest rate on the 
car loan, and the trade-in value of the owner's current vehicle-to name 
just a few of the price points open to negotiation. 
It makes no difference if the customer is interested in a new or a used 
car; the process is roughly the same. In the worst (and fairly common ) 
case, the shopper is met at the curb by a "greeter" who tries to determine if 
he or she is a "looker" or a serious buyer. Buyers are then turned over to a 
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more experienced salesman who finds a car the buyer wants and opens a 
period of painful and protracted price negotiation, retreating often to an 
office in the back to check offers and counteroffers with his manager. Even-
tually the sales manager himself will appear to continue the dickering over 
price, and, if the customer is unyielding, the sales manager is sometimes 
replaced by his manager. In the meantime, the buyer has had to work with 
the dealer's used-car appraiser to determine the trade-in value of his or her 
current car. Once the price of the new and used cars are agreed to, the cus-
tomer is turned over one more time to the business manager who not only 
negotiates finance and insurance charges, but also tries to sell dealer-in-
stalled add-ons such as fabric protection and rust proofing. 2 
As bad as this system may seem, historically things were even worse. 
Prior to 1958, the buyer often had no idea what the dealer's standard ask-
ing price was, because there was no established way to represent the price 
of cars on the lot. The requirement that all new cars carry a sticker listing 
the "manufacturer's suggested retail price" (MSRP) created a common 
starting point for price negotiations, but no more than that. The advent of 
the Internet has armed some buyers with more accurate information 
about dealer costs, but that has only made the negotiations fiercer, forcing 
dealers to give better prices to informed buyers and then trying to make 
up the loss of profit by keeping up the costs to others. With the isolated 
exception of General Motors Saturn division, dealers adjust the prices of 
their vehicles to the local market, charging additional markup on highly 
sought after cars and cutting the price of slow-selling ones. And even on a 
Saturn lot, where sticker prices are stuck to, negotiation can take place on 
ancillary products and services, and will always occur on the trade-in al-
lowance for the customer's current car. 
The process of haggling over the cost of an automobile evokes buyer 
consternation about prices and dealer grumbling that their legitimate 
profit margins are being shaved. Nevertheless, retail price negotiation has 
persisted during virtually the entire historical lifetime of the automobile. 
For one hundred years, even as marketplace bargaining gave way to set 
prices in nearly every other consumer transaction, the tradition of "horse 
trading" for cars has resisted all attempts to bring it into line with the re-
tail norm. The anomalous persistence of what dealers themselves have 
often disparagingly referred to as an "oriental bazaar" confirms how dra-
matically American attitudes toward the marketplace changed over the 
course of the 20th century. It also shows how the unique cultural meaning 
of automobiles shielded them from the normal one-price marketplace. 
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Car buying is an area of contemporary life where behavioral economics 
meets behavioral history. Behavioral economics seeks to understand the 
psychological reasons why people make economically irrational choices, 
and behavioral history tries to explain how historical patterns construct 
current behavior. The psychological meaning of automobiles is a cliche of 
popular literature, and there are few more overused double entendres than 
"auto-eroticism.''3 What is less obvious, but just as true, is the psychologi-
cal meaning of the historical pattern of bargaining for a car. The meaning 
of the car and the meaning of the way that car is obtained are linked by 
their continuity with the meaning and method of getting horses. Horse 
trading established the pattern for car dealing. Even though both buyers 
and sellers complain about the way the car business is conducted, and 
even though there is an obvious alternative model, behavioral history is 
one of the prime reasons we continue to subject ourselves to the ordeal of 
negotiating the price of both new and used cars. 
Automobiles began to be marketed as a mass-produced consumer 
product at the turn of the 20th century. This was the same period when 
the posted-price retail model pioneered by department stores became the 
standard for selling manufactured goods. Consumer-oriented contract law 
had evolved to extend unprecedented warranty protection to the pur-
chasers of factory-made products. These implied warranties, together with 
open and nonnegotiable prices, created an opportunity for cars to be mer-
chandised in the same manner as other new mechanical conveniences. Au-
tomobile retailers tried to emulate the one-price policy, but economic and 
technical issues combined with social/psychological forces to make the car 
market an anomaly in the contemporary retail world. Rather than follow-
ing the lead of other expensive mechanical appliances such as refrigerators 
and washing machines, car dealing retained the essential elements of the 
preindustrial marketplace. There were multiple reasons for cars' anom-
alous status, but most of them were related in one way or another to the 
fact that, socially and psychologically, cars were not so much horseless car-
riages as they were horseless horses, emblems of manhood to be acquired 
in a peculiarly "manly" way. 
One Price to All 
The retail transformation from individually negotiated prices to charging 
the same advertised price to everybody occurred in the late 19th and early 
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20th centuries and was the result of a shift in the psychological and social 
contexts of consumer behavior. Prior to the 20th century, consumption 
was almost always a personal transaction between a vendor (who was 
often also the producer) and a buyer, both of whom were likely to know 
each other as individuals in a unique interpersonal relationship. That 
broader knowledge of the other complexified the commercial relationship 
because it triggered feelings that transcended the simple exchange of 
value. Knowing that the other person was, for example, wealthy or 
strapped for cash, had a large family or was living alone, was a member of 
one or another socioethnic subculture, and so forth all altered the power 
relationship in the deal, and virtually every purchase was indeed a deal. 
Because the price for any item was established at the time of its sale 
through negotiation, that price often reflected not only the strict exchange 
value of the item to each party, but possibly also the constraints of in-
group sympathy, the opportunism of out-group antipathy, or particular 
knowledge of the other person's strengths or vulnerabilities. 
To the extent that participants in the preindustrial marketplace took 
extraneous factors into account when negotiating prices, they were deviat-
ing from a narrowly neoclassical model of economic behavior. Their free-
dom to buy low or sell high was constrained (or "bounded") by what oth-
ers, whose opinions they valued, would think of them and/or by how they 
would feel about themselves if they took advantage of, or failed to have 
sympathy for, the other person in a transaction. These are the kinds of 
subjective psychological considerations that distinguish the work of con-
temporary behavioral economists from that of their more objectively ana-
lytic colleagues. Feelings, which may have deep biological origins and of 
which people may hardly be aware, can influence the "rationality" of eco-
nomic decisions. Certain of those feelings are given much freer rein when 
people have to negotiate with each other to determine the purchase price 
of an item. In terms of the standard neoclassical model of economic be-
havior, face-to-face negotiation is a rational way to strike a bargain so long 
as it is an agreement between self-interested individuals, each of whom 
has the same information about the commodity for sale. However, this 
standard model is thwarted when a bargainer makes a decision on emo-
tional (that is, economically irrational) grounds. Opportunities for emo-
tional responses are increased considerably by having to haggle over price. 
The complexity of making retail decisions was simplified considerably 
with the advent of a marketplace in which sellers sold their products to 
buyers at a publicly stated price. In effect, posted prices depersonalized the 
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marketplace by making every customer a stranger and, by the same token, 
ensuring every stranger (customer) that he or she was not being cheated. 
This depersonalization ( or, what advocates at the time liked to call "de-
mocratization") of point-of-sale interactions was the direct result of ur-
banization, which made people more anonymous, and industrialization, 
which did the same for products. Just as city dwellers became nameless 
metaphorical cogs in the machinery of urban life, the real cogs of the real 
machines generated identical products whose sale was removed far from 
their production. Both sellers and buyers alike came to value the less so-
cially and emotionally inflected system of a one-price-to-all. Posted prices 
removed the necessity of "knowing somebody in the trade" to get a good 
deal and, as department store magnate John Wanamaker put it in 1874, 
"assuring equal rights to all" and "ruling out the possibility of unfairness."4 
When each unit of a product was the same, with sameness assured by 
product branding, the nature of marketplace competitiveness shifted. The 
competition among manufacturers and retailers heated up with multiple 
producers vying for sales of functionally similar products at both the 
wholesale and retail level, and multiple retailers competing with one an-
other to sell identical brand-name items.5 At the same time, competition 
between the retailer and the customer cooled down; in fact, it went away 
completely. Within a given store, every customer received the same treat-
ment and paid the same price. 
In a traditional transaction, for example, an individual buying corn-
meal from a storekeeper supplied by a local miller would typically ask the 
retailer how much the cornmeal was per pound and then ask for certain 
number of pounds. The storekeeper could shade the price higher or lower 
depending on his relationship with the buyer. And, depending on local 
practice, there might be a certain amount of dickering on the per pound 
price and the amount to be purchased, especially if the quality of the meal 
were open to question. 
However, after 1906, when factories began to transform cornmeal into 
identical boxes of corn flakes, a new set of assumptions came into play. 
The consumer now had to trust the manufacturer, not the retailer. Even if 
they wanted to, there was no way for malevolent store owners to adulter-
ate the product or rig the scales used to weigh it out, nor could benevolent 
retailers take special care that the product was fresh and weevil free. Qual-
ity was now the responsibility of a distant business. Those companies 
began to take pains to make the consumer believe that their brand of corn 
flakes was superior to similar products from other cereal companies and 
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that the purchaser could count on a uniform product, which, now that it 
was packaged, could not be examined until after it was bought. Conse-
quently, price competition developed among these similar products on 
two levels. Manufacturers sought to keep prices to the retailers low enough 
to allow the stores to sell at an acceptable profit, and retailers had to com-
pete with one another in price since a box of brand-name corn flakes was 
the same no matter where it was bought. 
There was, of course, no reason why shopkeepers could not bargain 
with consumers over the price of individual boxes of breakfast cereal. 
During the long transition from negotiated to set prices, a period from 
roughly 1860 to 1920, many stores did precisely that. The retail convention 
was to put a code on each manufactured item that told the shopkeeper or 
clerk how much it had cost the store and then for the clerk to tell cus-
tomers what their price would be. Because this system allowed the store to 
charge some people more than others for the same item, haggling contin-
ued to be part of the retail transaction, although the extent to which it was 
used apparently varied widely.6 
At first, consumers were worried that paying the posted price meant 
they were paying too much, but once it became clear that one-price stores 
really did charge everybody the same amount, the practice spread, partic-
ularly in urban areas. The first advocate of one-price merchandising ap-
pears to have been Quaker founder George Fox. Fox noted in 1653 that he 
wanted his followers to be so honest "that if a child were sent to their 
shops for anything, he was as well used as his parents would have been."7 
Even though single price policies helped Quaker businesses prosper, and 
there were more Quakers in America than in any other country, the prac-
tice did not spread widely in the United States until after the Civil War. 
Two merchants, R. H. Macy (a Quaker convert in New York) and John 
Wanamaker (in the Quaker center of Philadelphia) are most commonly 
credited with popularizing the concept of one-price at their respective de-
partment stores.8 During the same period, the mail-order houses of Mont-
gomery Ward and Sears Roebuck extended the fixed price concept to rural 
residents by taking advantage of the decreasing costs of printing and 
postage and, in effect, creating department stores in a catalog. 
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Nonnegotiating Women 
Historians invariably link the rise of Macy's, Wanamakers, and their many 
imitators to the new role of women as consumers.9 What was new for 
women, however, was the location and the scale and the method of con-
sumption, not the act itself of buying goods. In the preindustrial economy, 
American women seem to have purchased those items that they used in 
their household work, such as flour, cloth, and personal items for them-
selves and their children. Things used by men, such as farm equipment (in-
cluding horses), were bought by them. Expensive household items such as 
china and furniture appear to have been most often bought jointly in the 
sense that spouses negotiated an agreement with each other on what items 
to buy before one or both of them did any negotiating with a merchant. 
If women as well as men had a history of marketplace bargaining, then 
studies indicating that modern women are less likely to dispute the first 
offer made to them are probably identifying a postindustrial cultural phe-
nomenon. 10 It may well be that American women participated in a culture 
of negotiation until the 19th century, when a confluence of historical 
forces removed them from the role of price bargaining. In this way the 
change in how women shopped can be seen as a contributing factor to the 
broader Victorian idea that women had no place in activities that involved 
competition and confrontation. Just as the middle-class cult of true wom-
anhood and domesticity compensated women for their separation from 
the business world, the one-price model of the department store provided 
a way to get out into the world without having to engage in unfeminine 
bargaining contests with shopkeepers. 
Victorian and early 20th century department stores, like homes of the 
same era, were women's worlds where men were welcome but where fe-
male sensibilities prevailed. The stores catered to women's needs and tastes 
in a variety of ways. They were decorated sumptuously, providing tea 
rooms and lounges; they would deliver purchases to the women's homes 
so they did not have carry their acquisitions through the streets; they 
began to employ female clerks to sell the more intimate items to women 
customers; they accepted returns; and they openly posted the price of 
every item and sold it at that price to every customer. 
In a city where everyone was a stranger, the ad hoc pricing system that 
had prevailed in rural areas made less sense. The neighborly social codes 
that protected small-town buyers from exploitation did not exist. The 
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fixed-price system provided protection to the customer while it relieved 
clerks of the time and effort needed to negotiate a price each time an item 
was sold. Once the retail distinction between neighbors and strangers had 
been eliminated, all other distinctions disappeared as well-including the 
distinction between men and women. One price for all meant that in the 
consuming world of the department store, men became women, although 
in the working world of men, conflict, competition, and negotiation re-
mained the norm. 
The division of living space from working space imposed by industrial-
ism meant that many women became unfamiliar with the sphere of pro-
duction and thus had little knowledge of the costs (both human and mon-
etary) of earning a living. Whether or not they controlled the day-to-day 
finances in a particular household, women were dissociated from the ne-
gotiating that went on regularly at every level in every business. Men tried 
to get more money for less work, or vice versa; or they tried to get more 
product for less money, or vice versa. Men tried to get promoted ahead of 
their coworkers, acquire customers ahead of their competitors, and other-
wise win in the competitive game that was the daily world of work. 
Women were not expected to exercise these combative skills. There was, to 
be sure, rivalry for status and recognition among women, and vying for 
position in a social hierarchy created its own culture of competition, in 
which a keen sense of the cost of material possessions was essential for 
one's own status and an accurate assessment of other women's economic 
standing. Brand names and published prices only made this form of in-
vidious comparison easier. 
From the store's point of view, having set prices significantly lowered 
some of the costs of doing business. Most notably, a single price, along 
with the invention of a cash register that printed dual receipts, meant that 
salesclerks did not have to be given much latitude in the handling of 
money, so they could be trained more quickly for positions that paid less 
for less responsibility. Furthermore, clerks in the new department stores 
were usually paid straight wages rather than being compensated by com-
missions like outside sales representatives. While this may have lowered 
their incentive to sell, it also eliminated their incentive to cut prices to gain 
a sale on the theory that a small commission was better than none. Of 
course, the same was also true for the store as a whole. That is the ratio-
nale behind mass merchandising, but in the case of stores, the lower price 
could be advertised since it would be available to everybody who walked 
in the door. 
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The department store one-price policy quickly became the model for 
all retailing. By the end of World War I, shopping had become, for the 
most part, a much more transparent process than it had been a century 
before. Items were uniformly manufactured and labeled, and the retail 
consumer could systematically plan what to buy and where to buy it based 
on brand names and advertised prices. Business-to-business transactions, 
which continued to be dominated by men, were much slower to come 
around to a one-price policy. In fact, business-to-business sales prices are 
still subject to a very high level of variation based on negotiation . While 
inside retail sales became one of the few occupations open to women be-
fore the last half of the 20th century, outside sales remained a cutthroat 
male domain, a source of dramatic material from Arthur Miller's Willy 
Loman in Death of a Salesman to David Mamet's Shelly Levine in Glen-
garry Glen Ross. These are people who, like car salesmen, are paid by the 
sale, not by the hour. 
Cars as Consumer Commodities 
Because the shift to single-price retailing was taking place during the in-
fancy of the automobile industry, it might be expected that cars would be 
sold under the new one-price system. Cars were different from the horses 
they were replacing in enough ways that the moment was ripe for the 
breaking of old horse-oriented patterns. First, there was the possibility 
that cars would be less identified with men than were horses. As mechani-
cal conveyances they would not require as much physical strength to con-
trol as a twelve-hundred-pound beast with a mind of its own. As a general 
rule, women rarely rode horses and while some drove horse-drawn car-
riages or wagons, men often assumed that women lacked the requisite 
wrist, arm, and grip strength to control a pulling horse. In 1906 a writer in 
Outing magazine warned that "the husband, father, or other male relative 
who turns [a woman] loose upon the highways and byways, unattended 
by groom or other thoroughly competent [and obviously male] compan-
ion ... does a wicked and reprehensible thing." As far as the writer was 
concerned, the frequent avowal that a horse for sale was "safe for a woman 
to drive" was an oxymoron. 11 Early automobile manufacturers took ad-
vantage of these doubts about horse-driving skills of females and the ease 
of car driving to advertise their electric cars as quiet, clean, and easy to 
maneuver, and therefore especially suited for women. 
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A second reason that cars might have been sold differently from horses 
was their d istinct legal status as fabricated goods. "Purchasing a horse is a 
very diffe rent thing from buying a manufac tured article," explained a 19th-
century legal guide. The seller of a manufactured item knew exactly how it 
was made and could therefore confidently warrant its perfo rmance, but 
nobody could know what was going on inside a horse. It was foolish, 
therefore, advised the wri ter, to give or expect a warranty on a horse. 12 By 
the same logic, manufacturers could offer and buyers could expect a war-
ranty on manufactured goods such as automobiles. The courts, and then 
the legislatures, concluded that consumers could not be expected to accu-
rately judge the quality of something made by a machine the same way 
they had been traditionally expected to judge the quality of a natural 
product, so courts extended unprecedented protection to the purchasers 
of manufactured goods. 
Horse buyers traditionally operated under the principle of caveat emp-
tor (" let the buyer beware") and were not protected against problems with 
their purchases unless they had managed to get an explicit written war-
ranty. Car buyers, however, could operate under the assumption of an 
"impl ied warranty." 13 This meant that with new (but not used) cars, it was 
in the manufacturer's and dealer's interest to make sure their p roduct 
worked as advertised for at least the first couple of months, because if it 
did not, they would have to fix or replace it. Automobile advertising 
boasted about guarantees as ea rly as 1908. 14 This new set of assumptions 
about the nature of retail transactions expressed itself most dramatically 
in the late 19th century practice of department stores accepting returns of 
unsatisfactory items. There was no legal obligation fo r this new accommo-
dation, but it was a logical extension of the idea that any manufactured 
product should perform in a particular way, and it was one more way that 
stores could compete with one another fo r customer loyalty without hag-
gling over pu rchases. 
Finally, one might expect that a new fo rm of retailing fo r automobiles 
might have emerged at the beginning of the 20 th centu ry because the ini-
tial demand for cars far exceeded the supply. The New York Times reported 
in 1903 that dealers were demanding and getting 250 dollars over list price 
on 2500-dollar cars. 15 Despite their high price and the barriers posed by 
muddy unpaved roads, and their limited operability in winter, the new 
machines were wanted by more people than there was capacity to build 
them. Since this was the first generation of car owners, there were few 
used cars fo r either the buyers or sellers to worry about. Some new car 
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buyers wanted to trade in horses as partial payment for their new cars, but 
dealers did not have to accommodate them since there was no shortage of 
other customers willing to close a "straight" (i.e., no trade) deal. In other 
words, it appeared as though a motor car could be sold exactly the same 
way as a box of manufactured breakfast cereal; one price to all buyers from 
the same retailer, but with price competition among retailers and among 
manufacturers based on brand identification. 
As newly invented, ungendered machines, protected by a warranty and 
sold without a trade, there seemed to be little reason why automobiles 
could not be distributed through female-friendly department stores, 
rather than by outlets more akin to the old male bastion of the livery sta-
ble. This certainly was the reasoning of department store merchant (and 
early auto buff) John Wanamaker who was selling automobiles in his New 
York store as early as 1900. 16 In 1903 Wanamaker, added the new 800-dol-
lar Ford to his other brands. As a leader in the field of single-price mass 
merchandising, Wanamaker saw the retail logic of carrying a car that 
claimed to be 40 percent cheaper than any other automobile in its class. 17 
Wanamaker was not alone in his belief that automobiles, as standard-
ized products, could be sold like other manufactured consumer goods. In 
1909, a year after Henry Ford began producing his Model T, Sears Roebuck 
offered its house-brand "Motor Buggy Model P" to the public through its 
catalog. At half the price of a Model T, which itself was about half the 
price of most other cars, and presumably protected by the same money-
back guarantee of satisfaction that covered the other items in the Sears 
"Wish Book," the Sears Model P was a prime example of the new retail 
paradigm. Unfortunately for Sears, not many potential drivers were at-
tracted to the bare bones buggy with its large carriage wheels, even with 
the company's assurance that "you do not require mechanical training in 
order to operate the Sears Automobile; our Book of Instruction tell you 
how in thirty minutes." The car was discontinued after three years, unable 
to compete with the much more popular Ford. 18 
Neither department stores nor catalogs were ever able to establish a firm 
place in the automobile retail market. Although the terms "department 
store" and "supermarket" would continue to pop up periodically as ways to 
describe a variety of approaches to retailing automobiles, the core depart-
ment store concept of selling competing brand names at a posted price was 
difficult to implement for a number of reasons. First, the sheer cost of the 
car set it apart from other manufactured goods. From its beginning, the 
automobile was the most expensive mass-produced item most people ever 
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bought. In constant dollars, that 800-dollar 1903 Ford cost about the same 
as a low-end car one hundred years later, and the average unskilled worker 
in 1903 would have had to work five times as long as his 2003 counterpart 
to afford it. 19 In addition, there were practical problems selling cars in de-
partment stores: they were large and heavy and they needed to be prepared 
for sale and repaired under warranty by skilled mechanics. In this sense, 
cars were much like horses- they not only cost a lot, but also required ex-
tensive storage space and specialized care for their upkeep. 
Size and mechanical complexity made it more practical to sell cars 
fro m specialized automobile dealerships, but that in itself did not rule out 
the possibility of a one-price sales policy. Automobiles were a standardized 
commodity that lent themselves to uniform advertising, which often in-
cluded price. Even in the very early days of the automobile era, advertise-
ments for new cars were much more likely to state a specific price than ads 
fo r horses. Because the prices of new cars were often published in national 
advertisements, and included in local newspapers and in dealer brochures, 
buyers of a particular model used car had a much better idea of what a 
reasonable price for it might be than did the buyer of a horse. 20 This de-
creased the opportunities for dealers to take advantage of buyers. 
A one-price policy for cars was actually furthered by the emergence of 
specialty retail dealers because they led to exclusive franchise agreements 
with manufacturers as early as 1910. An exclusive franchise meant that 
there would be only one dealer for a particular brand in a defined geo-
graphic area. That dealer would get his cars at a standard discount and 
would be prohibited from reselling them to secondary dealers who might 
create additional brand-name competition. If dealers could be assured 
that they would be the only store in the community that was selling a par-
ticular brand, that removed the store-to-store level of competition that 
characterized the regular retail industry. This meant that car dealers could 
( and sometimes were contractually obligated to) charge the full factory-
set retail price. 2 1 
Nascent manufacturers benefited from this arrangement because they 
were frequently undercapitalized. They financed production by imposing 
minimum sales quotas on their dealers and requiring advance cash de-
posits and full payment on delivery. As long as demand outstripped sup-
ply, the manufacturers could create a long list of franchise conditions that 
required the dealers to maintain attractive premises, stock only factory re-
placement parts, employ competent mechanics, and not sell cars made by 
competing companies. Any violation of the rules meant the dealer lost his 
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franchise and his livelihood. Most of these retail principles were firmly es-
tablished before 1917 and remained substantially unchanged until 1949 
when key anticompetitive elements were struck down by the courts.22 
Its exclusive geographic franchise system distinguished automobile re-
tailing from the sale of most other consumer items because it guaranteed 
that there would be little or no competition among sellers of the same 
brand. High consumer demand for cars and lack of competition among 
dealers meant there was less pressure to cut prices, but high prices meant 
it was more difficult for people to afford a new car. To make matters 
worse, car buyers could not get credit. Older neighborhood storekeepers 
would carry customers on their books because they knew them as individ-
uals. Most newer urban department stores continued the custom for their 
best customers. 23 Even though middle-class customers had developed a 
habit of charging purchases, car dealers and banks were reluctant to ex-
tend credit to buyers. It was not until 1914 that either auto retailers or 
finance institutions began to make loans for new car sales.24 And it would 
be years before dealers and manufacturers realized they could make as 
much money from selling credit as they did from selling cars. In the 
meantime, cars were ostensibly sold for the advertised price and for cash. 
Scattered evidence indicates that despite the one-price policy de-
manded by manufacturers and given lip service by dealers, some car mer-
chants did give discounts off the retail price, although the magnitude of 
that practice is not clear. To the extent that it did occur, some price cutting 
on cars might have been expected because dickering over prices did not 
disappear entirely with the advent of the department-store model. Even 
after the beginning of the posted-price era, a certain amount of bargaining 
continued when so-called big ticket items were being bought and sold. 25 
Canny shoppers who knew that there were usually wide profit margins on 
high-priced goods might ask for and get a discount off the ticket price of 
large appliances or expensive jewelry. There was, however, no expectation 
by either buyer or seller that a price concession would automatically be 
asked for or given. Still, negotiating for the price of a car became the stan-
dard very early on despite the forces that might have discouraged it. 
Making the Car Male 
Had women, who were so closely associated with department stores and 
the one-price policy, become drivers sooner, cars might have been sold in 
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a more straightforward fashion. However, unlike their response to sewing 
machines and typewriters, few women became active operators of auto-
mobiles. Historian Virginia Scharff attributes much of the female exclu-
sion to the way in which the culture of male mechanics dominated the 
world of early automobiles. 26 There were a few adventuresome women 
who drove cars, some for long distances under quite adverse conditions, 
but they were notable exceptions.27 The idea that there could be a car for 
women drivers disappeared with the last of the electric autos. 
Women were often included in the marketing strategies for automo-
biles, but it was mostly men who drove them prior to World War I. Day-
to-day driving was a man's game for some very practical reasons. Until 
1912 cars had to be hand-cranked to start, a process that was both difficult 
and dangerous. Most cars were open to the weather, prone to mechanical 
breakdowns and flat tires, and regularly got stuck in the mud of unpaved 
roads. By the time electric self-starters and enclosed body styles became 
readily available, the die had been cast. Increasing numbers of women 
would drive in the 1920s, but the masculinity of the car business would re-
main essentially unchanged for the ensuing century. 
The high cost of most pre-Ford cars limited their market to upper-in-
come men who lived in or near the city where roads were more likely to be 
paved. These wealthy first-generation auto owners were used to having 
their horses and carriages attended by grooms and coachmen, and this pat-
tern was initially embraced for the new horseless carriages as well. Grooms 
and coachmen became chauffeurs, men who not only drove the cars but 
also attended to their mechanical well-being, just as they had looked after 
the day-to-day needs of horses. Since grooms and carriage drivers were 
historically male professions, the tradition of professional male control of 
personal transportation shifted easily with the new vehicles. 
At first, nobody was quite sure who should sell and service the new ma-
chines. The job fell to bicycle mechanics who were familiar with one form 
of mechanical transportation, to blacksmiths who could fashion or repair 
broken parts, and to stable owners who had the room and equipment to 
maintain carriages and cars. These latter two professions were made up of 
men who lived and breathed horses and were steeped in horse-trading 
culture. It is not surprising then that the male ethos of the horse trader 
would transfer to the new car dealers. Although they were curiosities, even 
at the time, stories of car dealers taking horses in trade reinforced the 
sense that there was some sort of equivalence to these purchases. More-
over, just as gentlemen or businessmen had depended on their grooms to 
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buy and sell their horses, early automobile owners often delegated the 
purchase of cars to their chauffeurs. Grooms had a reputation for accept-
ing (or demanding) bribes from traders to choose their horses. Chauffeurs 
did the same, undermining attempts to maintain a transparent one-price 
policy and planting the seeds of unethical marketplace negotiation. 
Speed kills. It also sells-perhaps because it kills-and pre-World War 
I automobile advertising was rife with boasts about how fast a particular 
car was, which races it had won, and which endurance trials it had run. 
Manufacturers sought publicity and attempted to prove the reliability of 
their machines by demonstrating their speed and durability. Both with 
company sponsorship and on the their own, car owners took part in street 
races, track races, cross-country races, and hill climbs that were all 
demonstrations of the quality of early cars-and their drivers. By doing 
so, these early drivers were creating mechanized versions of the quintes-
sentially male pastime of horse racing. 
Delight in speed had been part of the culture of young men for genera-
tions. Rural youth raced their horses on the roads and at fairs, and urban 
"scorchers" drove first their carriages and then their bicycles around city 
streets at breakneck speed, showing off to spectators and one another. A 
fast horse, noted the economist Thorstein Veblen in 1899, was a way for a 
man to appropriate "the animate forces of the environment" and "so ex-
press his own dominating individuality through them."28 Horses were, as 
cars would be, the public statement of a man's sociobiological success. 
Both were the bright plumage with which he could intimidate rival males 
and attract desirable females. 
To use Veblen's term, men used horses to express their "dominating in-
dividuality." As much as, and probably more than, anything else a inan 
would ever own, a horse was an expression of male identity and the desire 
to dominate other males. Owning a fast and fancy horse or carriage meant 
to the pre-20th century man exactly what owning a fast and fancy car 
means to a modern man: new was better than old; shiny was better than 
dull; fast was better than slow; tricked out was better than pared down; ex-
pensive spoke volumes about one's success. A man's means of personal 
transportation was a representation not only of his wealth, but also of his 
virility: "Being still under middle age," observed a horse buyer in 1836, "I 
am of course far from indifferent whether I am well mounted."29 
The psychological meaning of horses is an obvious historical example 
of behavioral, and perhaps even "cognitive;' economics in action. That is 
to say, the process of acquiring and owning a horse involved deep feelings 
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that shaped economic decisions and could cause people (in this case, 
men) to act in a way contrary to their best economic interests. While cost, 
size, and mechanical complexity were practical reasons why cars would be 
bought and sold in a particular way, the many irrational ( emotional) fac-
tors had roots in the historical relationship between horses and the male 
psyche. 
The Precedents in Horse Trading 
Horses have a long history as trophies. Like gold and women, they were 
traditional war booty because one could transport and display them. 
Horses continued to serve this symbolic function in America in two ways. 
As economic trophies they represented victory in the more generalized 
competition of the marketplace. Good horses were expensive, and owning 
one advertised business success. They were a particularly conspicuous 
form of conspicuous consumption. They were also, however, trophies of a 
much more immediate competition: the purchase and sale of the specific 
animal. As though the transaction for this trophy were a distilled example 
of the larger system, two men tested their business mettle to see who could 
emerge with the better deal, and because horse sales often involved trades, 
both parties ended up with material representations of the success or fail-
ure of their bargaining (combat) skills. 
When observers spoke and wrote about horse trading, what fascinated 
them were the one-on-one negotiations for a particular animal, not cor-
porate purchases of hundreds of horses or mules for drayage companies or 
mines. Every individual horse could be bargained for, and if a trade were 
involved, the bargaining concerned two horses. On the surface, there was 
nothing irrational about bargaining for a horse. As a natural commodity, 
every horse was different; nobody could know for sure what was going on 
inside a horse's body or brain, so buying one was always something of a 
gamble. Custom, and the law, assumed that buyers were competent judges 
of horseflesh, and therefore horses were sold "as is" except if there was a 
specific warranty that the animal was free of a given fault. There was fre-
quently, however, an irrational subtext to a horse trade; just enough dis-
simulation was tolerated by the male community of traders to make the 
transaction a game and, by definition, a game, has a winner and loser. 
According to the unstated rules of the horse-trading game, direct lies 
were unacceptable, as were clearly fraudulent devices that altered the ap-
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pearance or behavior of a horse. The rules were flexible and varied from 
place to place and over time, but they were widely enough understood that 
an entire genre of folklore evolved celebrating the victories and relishing 
the defeats of men who traded horses. As late as 1979, Deane C. Davis, the 
ex-governor of Vermont, enjoyed telling the undated story of a trial in 
which the buyer claimed that the seller had assured him the horse did not 
have a particular breathing disorder called "heaves." However, it turns out 
that the seller, who was a severe asthmatic, had in fact assured the buyer, 
"If this horse has got the heaves, I got the heaves." The jury concluded that 
the seller had, at least within the norms of the horse-trading game, told 
the truth and no fraud had been committed.30 In this incident the seller 
won and the buyer lost, and each in turn presumably experienced the 
pleasure of winning and the humiliation of losing. A humiliation, it might 
be supposed, that the buyer experienced anew every time his broken-
winded steed stopped to catch its breath. 
The disingenuous tradition of horse selling depended on two factors. 
Horses could come with a wide variety of hidden faults, and a buyer often 
had a horse to unload. The professional horse dealer could, therefore, 
make a profit in a number of ways. He could act as an honest broker, dis-
tributing horses with particular traits to people looking for that kind of a 
horse, and, in essence, charging a fee for that service by buying a bit low 
and selling a bit high. He could also charge the buyer "boot," or an extra fee 
in addition to the animal he took in trade. This was often done when pri-
vate parties were trading unequal animals. The boot was usually cash, but 
it also might be tack, a second animal, or anything else one of the parties 
was willing to give or take to make the deal. Finally, and most notoriously, 
the dealer could make money by disguising a horse's faults and selling it 
for much more than it was worth. Legendary horse traders had animals 
with easily hidden, but quickly discovered, faults, which they would buy 
back from the duped purchaser at a steep discount, in order to sell again to 
the next sucker. Such animals were actually worth more to traders than 
healthy or vice-free horses since they could be sold over and over again. 
The competitive game aspect of horse trading created an emotional 
( one could almost say, hormonal) context that made the process of ac-
quiring a horse part of the meaning of owning one. As manufactured 
goods, automobiles lacked the individual variations of horses and there-
fore lacked the essential quality of the unknown that enabled the horse-
trading game. This was the characteristic that made dealers think they 
could sell cars at a set price. History, however, conspired to trap new car 
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dealers into a gendered negotiating role that they have both reveled in and 
regretted ever since. 
Even if they could hold the line on the retail price of new cars, the ho-
mogeneity that made it possible to have a one-price policy for new manu-
factured items disappeared with secondhand automobiles. The used-goods 
marketplace retained a preindustrial haggling character because the 
unique history of every item offered for sale meant its price had to be de-
termined on an ad hoc basis. For new cars to be sold like other manufac-
tured goods, that transaction had to be isolated from any connection to the 
sale of used cars. Thus, it was not the fact of bargaining that distinguished 
the used-car market from the buying and selling of other used goods, but 
where that bargaining took place: at a retail store that sold new cars. 
By purchasing the new car buyer's old car, automobile dealers re-cre-
ated a sales situation very similar to the time-honored, if somewhat dis-
honorable, custom of horse trading. Car dealers were ambivalent about 
inheriting the mantle of the much-maligned horse trader. The old-time 
stableman had the reputation of taking advantage of his superior knowl-
edge to trick his customers by hiding the faults of his stock. So in the 
pre-World War I era, many car dealers tried to establish themselves as 
modern urban retailers, more like department stores than livery stables, 
but the culture of trading infiltrated the new industry, sometimes in re-
markably direct ways. For example, an early Iowa Ford dealer who regu-
larly accepted horses in trade for cars had a hostler who, he boasted, could 
"take any old nag, feed him oil meal for a couple of weeks, brush him up, 
put on a nice harness and hitch him in a nice rig" and end up with a horse 
that not even its old owner would recognize.31 It did not take much of an 
imagination to see how analogous techniques could also be applied to cars 
taken in trade. 
As secondhand commodities there was no implied warranty in used-
car sales, and few dealers were willing to give any explicit guarantees on 
previously owned vehicles. Instead, the car dealers embraced the ancient 
art of doctoring the product so that it looked better than it was. For al-
most every trick that horse traders had used to hide the organic shortcom-
ings of their stock, car dealers invented an analogous mechanical ruse. 
Where traders had dyed horses' gray hair, dealers painted over rust spots. 
Filing a horse's teeth to make it look younger gave way to turning back the 
odometer. Special diets to hide gastric problems in horses turned into 
extra heavy oil to dampen excessive engine noise. An unscrupulous hostler 
could rub red pepper or ginger on the anus of a placid horse to make it act 
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frisky, or feed the lethargic animal a stimulant. Similarly, secondhand car 
dealers would add ether to the gasoline to temporarily improve perfor-
mance. On the used car lot as in the horse trader's stable, things were sel-
dom what they seemed, and skim milk did in fact masquerade as cream. 
The historical stage was set for used-car dealers to follow in the lead of 
horse traders, but it was not inevitable that the used car would be bought 
(and then sold again) by the same person who retailed the new car. The 
public did not expect that any other merchant of manufactured goods 
would take the buyer's current article as a trade-in, with one very telling 
exception-the bicycle. For many younger men, the switch in personal 
transportation from horse to car went through an intermediate detour via 
bicycle. Bicycle mechanics were prominent among early automobile man-
ufacturers, and men who sold bicycles joined men who sold horses as early 
automobile dealers and mechanics. There is some indication that during 
the first years of the bicycle craze in the 1880s, as riders sought newer and 
better models, they asked dealers to buy back their older bikes, but as long 
as demand exceeded supply, dealers resisted the used-bicycle business. 
However, once the peak of the fad passed, cycle sellers began to emulate 
horse dealers by taking in trades.32 At one hundred dollars, a safety bicycle 
of the mid-189os would be worth something over two thousand dollars in 
today's money. That bike was cheaper than most horses, but still expensive 
enough to make a cyclist think twice about buying a new one without hav-
ing a buyer for his old model. 
Their very cost was one of the reasons that horses and cars bestowed 
prestige on their owners, and cars were ten or twenty times as expensive as 
bicycles. If men wanted to maintain or improve their social standing by 
buying newer or better automobiles, there had to be a way to make them 
more affordable. The goal of affordability was achieved in car dealing as it 
had in horse trading and bicycle sales by sellers taking the owners' current 
transportation as partial payment for a new one. As early as 1903 new-car 
dealers were advertising good deals on used cars. While the demand for 
new automobiles was still high, these used cars may have been offered on 
consignment as a favor for new-car buyers.33 However, in just a couple of 
years, when the supply caught up with demand, new-car dealers were buy-
ing used cars directly from their customers. Just as they had come to ex-
pect that horse dealers would accept trades, car owners wanted auto deal-
ers to extend the same service. 
In the retail sense, the car had already become a horseless horse, and, in 
turn, the automobile dealer had become a car trader. Reselling used cars 
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opened up another market in which dealers could provide cars for men 
who could not afford a new vehicle, but it also opened up the opportunity 
for price negotiation and marketplace dishonesty. While it might have been 
easier to estimate the trade-in value of a used car than a horse, new-car 
buyers still could not know exactly what their old car was worth. The value 
of a used automobile was based on too many variables. The age, mileage, 
and condition of the car all affected its resale price, but so did market cir-
cumstances that had nothing to do with the condition of the car itself. For 
example, shifting consumer brand preferences and the rapid rise and fall of 
automobile companies could make a perfectly good car much less desir-
able. Value was also affected by the time of year because cars sold best in 
spring and summer. Since the dealer had to sell any used car he bought, he 
had not only a strong incentive to pay bottom and charge top dollar, but 
also to doctor the car so that it appeared to be better than it actually was. 
Early dealers developed a full repertoire of techniques to improve the 
resale value of trade-ins. New paint and tires were almost standard, as 
were other cosmetic improvements. These kinds of changes might make 
an automobile look better cared for than it actually had been, but they 
were no more dishonest than getting a haircut, shoeshine, and new suit for 
a job interview. Many of the other techniques, however, were meant to de-
liberately disguise serious faults. It did not take long for used-car buyers to 
learn to distrust used-car dealers. In 1904, even before the first wave of de-
mand had been satisfied, the Broadway Automobile Exchange, a used-car 
lot in New York City, headlined its display ads, "No Junks, No Misrepre-
sentations."34 Clearly, the company was trying to disavow a dubious repu-
tation that used-car dealers had already inherited from horse traders. 
Used-car dealers who operated independently of new-car dealers were 
heirs to the notorious "gypsy" horse traders who never expected a cus-
tomer to return for a second purchase. But because new-car dealers ap-
pear to have bought more used cars than independent used car lot opera-
tors, both the shady techniques and the shady reputation that grew up 
around used cars infected the new-car environment as well. 
Dealer competition for the new-car buyer turned out to be stronger 
than dealer desire to be a modern merchant who dealt only in new items. 
Thus, the old tradition of men swapping transportation (and lies) in the 
marketplace was reborn. At the same time, the idea of a one-price policy 
became impossible, because now the real price of a new car was the differ-
ence between what the buyer gave the dealer for the new car and what he 
got back from the dealer for his trade-in, usually called the "allowance." It 
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made no difference if the price of the new car were fixed and public, be-
cause the price of the used car always had to be negotiated. The dealer may 
have been contractually obliged to sell the new car at a specific advertised 
price, but nobody could tell him what to pay for a trade-in. It did not take 
customers long to figure out that when a dealer would pay him more than 
a used car was worth (an "over-allowance") he was getting a de facto dis-
count on a new car. And reciprocally, the dealers began to figure out ways 
to jack up the price of new cars to cover the additional cost of over-al-
lowances. This was often done by adding spurious transportation charges, 
or requiring that the buyers purchase overpriced accessories known in the 
trade as the "pack." 
Conclusion 
If department stores turned male customers into women by offering them 
a single price in a feminine environment, then car dealers turned women 
into men by not posting one true price for their new cars and always ne-
gotiating what they would pay for a trade-in. Even as cars became easier to 
drive in the 1920s and larger numbers of women drove, men continued to 
sell them, mostly to other men. Car salesmen recognized that women 
played a role in the purchase of new cars, and training literature frequently 
reminded salesmen to include wives in their presentations, but it also ac-
knowledged that husbands did the actual buying of a new car and even 
more so, the selling of the old. Occasional campaigns to sell cars directly 
to women were invariably short-lived, and experiments with female car 
"salesmen" were similarly brief. In effect, the car sales lot became a battle-
ground or playing field, a place where men locked horns in an attempt to 
dominate one another. It was hardly more welcoming to women than a 
pool hall or barbershop. 
By focusing on the survival of horse-trading traditions in car dealing, 
behavioral history allows us to understand why we continue to engage in 
the unpleasant anachronism of bargaining for the price of a car. New cars 
could be sold like new electronic equipment, and used cars, like used 
houses, might be sold in a transaction completely divorced from the pur-
chase of a new car. But the male traditions of horse trading created an ex-
pectation that the dealer would buy the customer's existing car. As high-
priced representations of their owners, automobiles had meaning beyond 
mere transportation, and the process of acquiring them came to be in-
Horseless Horses 139 
fused with the same emotional significance that had marked horse trades. 
For the next hundred yea rs, neither buyers nor sellers were able to extri-
cate themselves from a system both claimed to hate. Market realities com-
bined with psychological forces to keep them both in an arena where the 
masculine clank of arms drowned out the reasoned feminine position of 
one price to all , with returns cheerfully accepted. 
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